Monotonicity and Persistence in Preferential Logics by Engelfriet, J.
Journal of Articial Intelligence Research 8 (1998) 1-21 Submitted 8/97; published 1/98
Monotonicity and Persistence in Preferential Logics
Joeri Engelfriet joeri@cs.vu.nl
Vrije Universiteit, Faculty of Mathematics and Computer Science
De Boelelaan 1081a, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands
Abstract
An important characteristic of many logics for Articial Intelligence is their nonmono-
tonicity. This means that adding a formula to the premises can invalidate some of the
consequences. There may, however, exist formulae that can always be safely added to the
premises without destroying any of the consequences: we say they respect monotonicity.
Also, there may be formulae that, when they are a consequence, can not be invalidated
when adding any formula to the premises: we call them conservative. We study these
two classes of formulae for preferential logics, and show that they are closely linked to the
formulae whose truth-value is preserved along the (preferential) ordering. We will con-
sider some preferential logics for illustration, and prove syntactic characterization results
for them. The results in this paper may improve the eciency of theorem provers for
preferential logics.
1. Introduction
Over the past decades, many non-classical logics for Articial Intelligence have been dened
and investigated. The need for such logics arose from the unsuitability of classical logics to
describe defeasible reasoning. These classical logics are monotonic, which means that their
consequence relation (j

) satises:
8; ; ' : ( j

 )  ^ ' j

) (Monotonicity)
This means that whenever we learn new information (') and add this to what we already
know (), all the old theorems () are still derivable. This is clearly undesirable when
describing defeasible reasoning. Therefore, monotonicity is not satised by many logics for
Articial Intelligence.
On the other hand, monotonicity is a very attractive feature from a practical point of
view. When learning new information, we do not have to start all over again, but we can
retain our old conclusions, and focus on deriving possible new ones. Furthermore, when we
have a lot of information, we are allowed to focus on only part of it. Conclusions derived
from this part are then automatically also valid when considering all the information we
have (this is sometimes called local reasoning).
Even though it is clear that we do not want monotonicity to hold in general, it might
be worthwhile to investigate restricted variants of monotonicity. In the past, such variants
have been dened which allow us to keep the old theorems, when either the new informa-
tion follows from the old premise (this variant is called Cautious Monotonicity by Kraus,
Lehmann, & Magidor, 1990) or its negation can not be derived from the old premise (this
is called Rational Monotonicity by Kraus et al., 1990).
c
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We will take a somewhat dierent perspective, and consider two classes of formulae: the
class of formulae that can always be added to a premise without invalidating old conclusions
(we say these formulae respect monotonicity), and the class of formulae which can always be
retained as conclusions, no matter which new information is added to the premise (we say
these formulae are conservative). The advantages of monotonicity sketched above would
still hold when we restrict ' to the class of formulae that respect monotonicity, or when
we restrict  to be conservative. Whether such classes exist, and what these classes are,
depends of course on the particular nonmonotonic logic considered. We will focus here on
an important class of nonmonotonic logics: the class of preferential logics (Shoham, 1987,
1988). These logics are based on a monotonic logic (such as propositional logic, predicate
logic or modal logic) augmented with a preference order on its models. The nonmonotonic
consequences of a formula  are those formulae which are true in all models of  which
are minimal in the preference order among all models of  (an extensive discussion of
preferential logics is provided by van Benthem, 1989). We will give a formal denition.
Denition 1 (Preferential logic) A preferential logic consists of a language L, a class
of models Mod together with a satisfaction relation j= between models and formulae, and
a partial order  on Mod. A model m 2 Mod is called a minimal model of a formula 
(denoted m j=

) if m j=  and for all models n, if n  m and n j=  then n = m.
Preferential entailment (j=

) between formulae is dened as follows: for ;  2 L :  j=


if  is true in all minimal models of .
Our presentation uses a partial order, i.e., a reexive, antisymmetric and transitive
relation. Shoham (1987) uses a strict partial order, i.e., an irreexive transitive relation,
with a slightly dierent notion of minimal model. The presentations can be translated into
each other.
It will turn out that formulae whose truth is preserved when going to more preferred
or less preferred models, play an important role with respect to the two classes of formulae
dened above (the class of formulae that respect monotonicity, and the class of conservative
formulae). We will rst give a denition.
Denition 2 (Persistence) Given a preferential logic (L;Mod; j=;), a formula  2 L is
called downward persistent in this logic, if
8m;n 2Mod : (m j=  and n  m)) n j= ;
and it is called upward persistent if
8m;n 2Mod : (n j=  and n  m)) m j= :
In the next section, we will introduce some preferential logics to illustrate the material
in the rest of the paper. In Section 3 we will consider formulae that respect monotonicity,
and in Section 4 conservative formulae will be treated. The practical implications of the
results of this paper are discussed in Section 5. Section 6 gives conclusions and suggestions
for further research. Part of the material in this paper appeared in (Engelfriet, 1996b).
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2. Some Preferential Logics
In this section we will describe the following preferential logics: Ground S5, Minimal Tem-
poral Epistemic Logic and Circumscription. Since we have already dened preferential
entailment in general, for each logic we only have to give its ingredients, i.e., L;Mod; j=,
and . The preferential entailment relation is then xed by Denition 1. The rst logic we
will consider is Ground S5.
2.1 Ground S5
Ground S5 is a nonmonotonic modal logic for auto-epistemic reasoning, originally proposed
by Halpern and Moses (1985). Their aim was to formalize statements of the form "I only
know '". It allows, for example, to derive that an agent which only knows p, does not
know q. Ground S5 falls into the general scheme of ground nonmonotonic modal logics
(Donini, Nardi, & Rosati, 1997). A lot of interest is devoted to logics of minimal knowledge
(Levesque, 1990; Schwarz & Truszczynski, 1994; Chen, 1997; Halpern, 1997).
Semantically, states in which an agent only knows ', are states in which ' is known, but
otherwise the amount of knowledge is minimal. We will use a modal propositional language
to express the knowledge of the agent, and S5 will be the monotonic logic. We will give a
treatment of Ground S5 slightly dierent, but equivalent to the one given by Halpern and
Moses (1985).
Denition 3 (Epistemic language) Let P be a (nite or countably innite) set of propo-
sitional atoms. The language L
S5
is the smallest set closed under:
 if p 2 P then p 2 L
S5
;
 if '; 2 L
S5
then K';' ^  ;:' 2 L
S5
.
Furthermore, we introduce the following abbreviations:
' _   :(:' ^ : ); '!   :' _  ;M'  :K:';>  p _ :p;?  :>:
If every atom occurring in a formula ' is in the scope of a K operator, we call ' subjective.
An example of a subjective formula is :Kp ^ K(q ! p), whereas K(p ^ q) _ s is not
subjective. In the rest of this paper we will only be interested in subjective formulae: they
describe (just) the knowledge and ignorance of the agent.
In the usual S5 semantics, a model is a triple (W;R; ), where W is a set of worlds, R is
an equivalence relation on W and  is a function that assigns a propositional valuation to
each world in W . We may however, in the case of one agent, restrict ourselves to normal S5
models, in which the relation is universal (each world is accessible from every world), and
worlds are identied with propositional valuations (a proof of soundness and completeness
of S5 with respect to these semantics is given by Meyer & van der Hoek, 1995).
Denition 4 (S5 semantics) Let P be a (nite or countably innite) set of propositional
atoms. A propositional valuation is a function from P into f0; 1g where 0 stands for false
and 1 for true. The set of all such valuations will be denoted by Mod(P ). A normal S5
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model M is a non-empty subset of Mod(P ). The truth of an S5 formula ' in such a model,
evaluated in a world m 2M , denoted (M;m) j=
S5
', is dened inductively:
1: (M;m) j=
S5
p , m(p) = 1, for p 2 P
2: (M;m) j=
S5
' ^  , (M;m) j=
S5
' and (M;m) j=
S5
 
3: (M;m) j=
S5
:' , it is not the case that (M;m) j=
S5
'
4: (M;m) j=
S5
K' , (M;m
0
) j=
S5
' for every m
0
2M
We have the following elementary results on subjective formulae. The proofs are straight-
forward.
Proposition 5 (Subjective formulae)
1. Let ' be a subjective formula. For a normal S5 model M and m
1
;m
2
2M it holds:
(M;m
1
) j=
S5
', (M;m
2
) j=
S5
':
We dene M j=
S5
' if (M;m) j=
S5
' for some, or, equivalently, all m 2 M . The set
of all normal S5 models, sometimes called information states, is denoted by IS.
2. An S5 formula ' is subjective if and only if it is equivalent to a formula of the form
K' with ' 2 L
S5
.
A subjective formula describes the knowledge of an agent, but we want to formalize that
this is all the agent knows. Therefore we are looking for models in which the knowledge of
the agent is minimal, or in other words, in which the ignorance of the agent is maximal. We
introduce a preference order over information states which favors models with less knowl-
edge. The denition of this ordering is based on the observation that the more valuations
the agent considers possible, the less knowledge the agent has. Indeed, for any propositional
formula ' we have: if M
1
j= K' and M
1
M
2
then M
2
j= K'.
Denition 6 (Degree of knowledge) We dene the degree-of-knowledge ordering  on
normal S5 models as follows: for M
1
;M
2
2 IS :M
1
M
2
,M
1
M
2
.
Ground S5 is the preferential logic based on this ordering.
Denition 7 (Ground S5) Ground S5 is the preferential logic with the subjective formu-
lae of L
S5
as its language, IS as its class of models, the satisfaction relation of Proposition 5
and the ordering of Denition 6. We will denote preferential entailment (as dened in Def-
inition 1) of Ground S5 by j=
GS5
.
The reader can now check that, for instance, Kp j=
GS5
:Kq. The (unique) minimal
S5 model of Kp consists of all propositional valuations in which p is true, and this indeed
contains a model in which q is false. The entailment relation is nonmonotonic since Kp ^
Kq 6j=
GS5
:Kq. Another example illustrates the minimality of the agent's knowledge: Kp_
Kq j=
GS5
:(Kp ^Kq).
Let us dene a consequence relation j

by ' j

 if K' j=
GS5
K . Then it turns out
that this is the consequence relation of Halpern and Moses (1985), apart from the fact that
they only dened it for premises which have a unique minimal model. Premises with a
unique minimal model are called honest. To give an example, the formula Kp is honest,
but Kp _Kq is not: both the S5 model consisting of all valuations in which p is true, and
the model with all valuations in which q is true, are minimal models.
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2.2 Minimal Temporal Epistemic Logic
In Ground S5, we are only able to express something about `all the agent knows' at a
particular instant. We will extend this logic in such a way that we are also able to say
something about the changing knowledge of the agent over time. Originally, this extended
logic was intended as a means of specifying nonmonotonic reasoning processes and of rea-
soning about their properties (Engelfriet & Treur, 1994, 1996; Engelfriet, 1996a). The idea
is that a temporal formula describes the nonmonotonic inferences the agent has to perform
during the course of a reasoning process (analogously to the use of temporal logic for spec-
ifying computer processes). But these inferences should also be the only cause of increases
in the agent's knowledge. Therefore, we again have to minimize the agent's knowledge, but
now over time (analogously to the use of minimization for dealing with the frame problem
in temporal logics for describing action and change, Shoham, 1988). To this end, we will
temporalize the epistemic language, epistemic models and the degree-of-knowledge ordering.
In order to describe past and future we introduce temporal operators P;H; F;G and
2, denoting respectively \sometimes in the past", \always in the past", \sometimes in the
future", \always in the future" and \always". We do not want to describe the agent's knowl-
edge of the future and past, but the future and past of the agent's knowledge. Therefore,
temporal operators are not allowed to occur within the scope of the epistemic K operator.
Denition 8 (Temporal epistemic language) The language L
TEL
is the smallest set
closed under:
 if ' 2 L
S5
then ' 2 L
TEL
;
 if ;  2 L
TEL
then  ^ ;:; P; F 2 L
TEL
.
Again the abbreviations for _;!;> and ? are introduced, as well as:
G  :F (:);H  :P (:) and 2  H ^  ^G:
If in the rst clause we restrict ourselves to subjective formulae, we get the set of subjective
TEL formulae.
In the rest of this paper we will be interested in subjective TEL formulae since they
describe how the knowledge of the agent is changing over time. Based on the set of natural
numbers (N) as ow of time, and normal S5 models as formalization of states in a temporal
model, the following semantics is introduced for temporal epistemic logic (TEL):
Denition 9 (Semantics of TEL) A TEL model is a function M : N! IS . The truth
of a formula ' 2 L
TEL
inM at time point t 2N, denoted (M; t) j= ', is dened inductively
as follows:
1: (M; t) j= ' , M(t) j=
S5
', if ' 2 L
S5
2: (M; t) j= ' ^  , (M; t) j= ' and (M; t) j=  
3: (M; t) j= :' , it is not the case that (M; t) j= '
4: (M; t) j= P' , 9s 2 N such that s < t and (M; s) j= '
5: (M; t) j= F' , 9s 2 N such that t < s and (M; s) j= '
5
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A formula ' is true in a model M , denoted M j= ', if (M; 0) j= '. A TEL model M
is called conservative (or a TELC model) if for all s < t 2 N : M(s)  M(t), with the
ordering  of Denition 6. The set of TELC models is denoted by TCIS.
Note that the above denition is in principle ambiguous: a formula like Kp ^ Kq is
an S5 formula which can be interpreted according to the rst semantic clause, but it can
also be seen as a conjunction, to be interpreted according to the second clause. As the
interpretation of the conjunction (and the same holds for negation) is the same in S5 as in
TEL, this ambiguity is harmless.
We will briey explain the reason we have dened M j= ' if (M; 0) j= '. Later on, we
will make the general assumption on preferential logics that the language contains negation,
and that m j= :' if and only if m 6j= ' (Assumption 1). If we dene M j= ' if (M; t) j= '
for all t 2 N, then this assumption would not hold for TEL. The two denitions can be
translated into each other, since (M; 0) j= ' if and only if (M; t) j= :P>! ' for all t 2 N
and (M; t) j= ' for all t 2 N if and only if (M; 0) j= '^G'. This is also one of the reasons
we gave a slightly dierent presentation of Ground S5 (using subjective formulae).
In conservative models, the propositional knowledge of an agent can only increase in
time. We will restrict ourselves to these models, i.e., an agent can not forget or revise its
(propositional) knowledge. Indeed, for a propositional formula ' and a TELC modelM , if
(M; t) j= K' then (M; s) j= K' for all s > t. This restriction can be made when the agent
is reasoning about a xed (non-changing) situation, and we are abstracting from particular
implementation details (such as the use of backtracking implementations for nonmonotonic
logics). We now extend the ordering and minimal consequence relation to TELC models.
The ordering is extended in a pointwise fashion.
Denition 10 (Minimal temporal epistemic logic)
1. We extend the degree-of-knowledge ordering to TELC models by dening
M N , for all s 2N :M(s)  N (s):
2. Minimal temporal epistemic logic (MTEL) is the preferential logic with the subjective
TEL formulae as its language, TCIS as its class of models, the satisfaction relation
(M j= ') of Denition 9 and the ordering of item 1. We will denote preferential
entailment (as dened in Denition 1) of MTEL by j=
MTEL
.
The idea behind using MTEL for specifying reasoning processes is that a subjective
TEL formula ' describes the reasoning of an agent over time (it can, for example, describe
the use of nonmonotonic inference rules, see Proposition 11). The minimal models of '
represent the process of the agent reasoning in time. We can then use minimal consequence
to infer properties of this reasoning process.
It is easy to see that MTEL is a generalization of Ground S5: for subjective S5 formulae
'; we have that ' j=
MTEL
 if and only if ' j=
GS5
 . As an example of the use of the
notion of minimal temporal epistemic consequence, it has been shown by Engelfriet and
Treur (1993) that it can capture default logic (Reiter, 1980b).
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Proposition 11 (Default logic in MTEL) Let a nite, propositional default theory  =
hW;Di be given and let
 =
^
f2(K ^G(:K:)! G(K)) j (; )= 2 Dg ^
^
fK j  2Wg:
Then ' is a sceptical consequence of  in default logic if and only if  j=
MTEL
F (K').
The conjuncts of the form 2(K ^G(:K:)! G(K)) ensure the application of the
default rules. In words: if the agent knows the prerequisite (), and the justication ()
remains consistent with what the agent knows throughout the future, then the agent must
conclude the consequent () in the next moment in time (and it will know  henceforth).
2.3 Circumscription
One of the earliest approaches to nonmonotonic reasoning is circumscription (McCarthy,
1977, 1980; Davis, 1980; Lifschitz, 1994; Etherington, 1988), a preferential logic based on
rst-order predicate logic. The main idea behind circumscription is a kind of completeness
of information given to us: \the premises as stated give us `the whole truth' about the
matter" (van Benthem, 1989). This leads to at least two kinds of minimality: predicate-
minimality and domain-minimality. The intuition behind predicate-minimality is that for
some relevant property (predicate), all objects that have this property, are explicitly said
to have this property in the premise. This allows us to formulate defaults stating that all
normal objects have some property. Minimizing abnormality will allow us to conclude an
object has this property, unless we can deduce from the premise that this object is abnormal.
The intuition behind domain-minimality, is that the domain (of discourse) contains no other
objects than those that can be deduced to exist from the premise. (This intuition is strongly
tied to the domain-closure assumption of Reiter, 1980a). These two kinds of minimality are
formalized by two variants of Circumscription. Both of them will be treated below.
The classical logic underlying circumscription is rst-order predicate logic. We assume
a standard rst-order language L with a nite number of predicate symbols, including
equality. We will also assume that the language contains no function or constant symbols.
This is not a severe limitation, since we can eliminate function and constant symbols by
introducing new predicate symbols (Davis, 1980). We will rst give the denition of the
orderings and then dene predicate and domain circumscriptive consequence.
Denition 12
1. Let P be a predicate symbol in the language L. For a structure M for the language,
P
M
denotes the interpretation of P in M (so P
M
is a subset of dom(M)
n
, where
dom(M) is the domain of M , and n is the arity of P ). For two structures M;N ,
we say M is P -preferred to N , denoted M 
P
N , if they have the same domain,
the same interpretation of predicate symbols other than P , and P
M
 P
N
. Predicate
circumscription of P is the preferential logic which uses rst-order predicate logic for
the language, models and satisfaction relation, augmented with the ordering 
P
. We
will denote preferential entailment (as dened in Denition 1) in this logic by j=
PC
P
.
2. For two structures M;N for the language L, we say N is a substructure ofM , denoted
N 
d
M , if the domain of N is a subset of the domain of M , and the interpretation
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of each predicate symbol in N is the restriction of the corresponding interpretation in
M to dom(N). Domain circumscription is the preferential logic which uses rst-order
predicate logic for the language, models and satisfaction relation, augmented with the
ordering 
d
. We will denote preferential entailment in this logic by j=
DC
.
3. If we restrict the model class to nite structures, the resulting preferential logics are
called nite predicate circumscription and nite domain circumscription.
We refer the reader to the references given above for standard results and motivation of
circumscription.
3. Respecting Monotonicity
In this section we will study formulae which respect monotonicity. We will rst give a
formal denition.
Denition 13 (Respecting monotonicity) Given a preferential logic, we say a formula
' respects monotonicity, if
8;  :  j=

 )  ^ ' j=

:
Next, we will make some basic assumptions about the (underlying logic of the) prefer-
ential logic.
Assumption 1 From now on we will assume that any preferential logic satises the fol-
lowing:
 the language has conjunction (^) and m j= ' ^  , m j= ' and m j=  .
 the language has implication (!) and m j= '!  , m 6j= ' or m j=  .
 the language has negation (:) and m j= :', m 6j= '.
We can then immediately identify a class of formulae that respect monotonicity:
Proposition 14 Downward persistent formulae respect monotonicity.
Proof: Suppose ' is downward persistent. Let ;  be formulae and suppose  j=

. Let
m be a minimal model of ^'. Then it is also a minimal model of . For suppose it is not,
then there exists n  m, n 6= m and n j= . Since m j= ' and ' is downward persistent, we
have n j= '. But then n j=  ^ ' which contradicts the assumption that m was a minimal
model of  ^ '. Since m is a minimal model of  and  j=

, we have m j= . We have
proved that  ^ ' j=

. Thus, ' respects monotonicity. 2
Of course, valid and unsatisable sentences are downward persistent. But the ques-
tion is whether non-trivial downward persistent formulae exist. For the preferential logics
introduced in Section 2, the answer is armative.
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Denition 15 (DIAM) Dene the class of S5 formulae DIAM by:
DIAM ::=M(') j DIAM ^DIAM j DIAM _DIAM jM(DIAM)
where ' is propositional.
Formulae from DIAM essentially only contain theM operator (the `diamond' of S5, and
not the `box' operator K). Formulae in this class are the only subjective formulae (up to
equivalence) which are downward persistent in Ground S5 (this was proved by Engelfriet,
1996a).
Theorem 16 A subjective S5 formula ' is downward persistent in Ground S5 if and only
if it is S5-equivalent to a formula in DIAM.
So in Ground S5 there is a non-empty class of downward persistent formulae, that
respect monotonicity by Proposition 14. Essentially, these formulae only say something
about the ignorance of the agent. One might think that formulae from DIAM are completely
uninteresting, and never yield any new insights in Ground S5. The converse of monotonicity
for these formulae,  ^ ' j=
GS5
 )  j=
GS5
, however, does not hold, even when ' is
consistent with . We do not have that Kp _ Kq j=
GS5
Kq, whereas we do have that
(Kp _ Kq) ^M(:p) j=
GS5
Kq with M(:p) 2 DIAM. So knowledge of ignorance can be
useful.
An analogous result holds for minimal temporal epistemic logic.
Denition 17 (TD)
1. Dene
TD ::= DIAM j TD ^TD j TD _ TD j F (TD) j G(TD) j P (TD) j H(TD)
2. For two subjective TEL formulae '; :
'   ,
def
for all TELC models M :M j= ',M j=  :
TD stands for `temporal diamond' formulae. The following was also proved by Engelfriet
(1996a).
Theorem 18 In MTEL, a formula ' is downward persistent if and only if it is equivalent
(in the sense of ) to a formula in TD.
As in the case of Ground S5, these formulae express (temporal) ignorance of the agent.
Denition 19 (Positive and universal formulae) A rst-order predicate formula is neg-
ative in a predicate P , if all occurrences of the predicate P are in the scope of an odd number
of negations. A formula is universal if it is of the form 8x
1
: : : x
n
 where  is quantier
free.
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The following result links these formulae to downward persistence in circumscription.
The rst is a variant of Lyndon's theorem and is folklore (we leave the details to the
reader); the second result is known as the  Los-Tarski theorem (Chang & Keisler, 1990,
Theorem 3.2.2).
Theorem 20
1. A rst-order predicate formula ' is downward persistent in predicate circumscription
(of P ) if and only if it is equivalent to a formula that is negative in P .
2. A rst-order predicate formula ' is downward persistent in domain circumscription if
and only if it is equivalent to a universal formula.
So downward persistent formulae in predicate circumscription essentially only say some-
thing about elements not having property P (besides the other properties they mention),
and downward persistent formulae in domain circumscription essentially only mention uni-
versal properties (and do not say anything about the existence of objects).
For our examples, we have shown that non-trivial classes of formulae that respect mono-
tonicity exist. The question is whether there are more such formulae, besides those that are
downward persistent. We will give a criterion that ensures that there are no more formulae
that respect monotonicity.
Denition 21 (Expressibility of preference) A preferential logic satises expressibil-
ity of preference if the following holds:
8m 2 Mod : 9'
m
2 L : 8n 2Mod : (n j= '
m
, m  n):
The formula '
m
expresses: \I am less preferred than m," and describes exactly those
models which are larger in the preferential ordering. The criterion of expressibility of
preference poses a requirement on the expressiveness of the language, given its semantics.
We will prove that in preferential logics that satisfy the condition in this denition, the
downward persistent formulae are the only ones that respect monotonicity. The above
condition can be generalized by taking into account equivalent models; we have not done
this immediately as it makes things rather cumbersome. If whenever n  m and m  k
(where m  k means that m and k satisfy the same formulae), there exists a model l such
that l  n and l  k, then we can generalize the condition to: 8m 2 Mod : 9'
m
2 L : 8n 2
Mod : (n j= '
m
, 9k 2 Mod : m  k & k  n).
Theorem 22 (Only if : : : ) For a preferential logic that satises expressibility of prefer-
ence we have: if a formula respect monotonicity, then it is downward persistent.
Proof: Suppose a formula ' is not downward persistent, then there exist models m and
n such that m j= ', n 6j= ' and n  m. Dene  = '
n
^ (' ! '
m
) and  = :'. First
we claim that  j=

. Since n  n, we have n j= '
n
, and as n 6j= ' we get n j= .
Furthermore, for any model k, if k j=  then in particular k j= '
n
so n  k. Therefore,
n is the only minimal model of , and since n 6j= ', we have n j= . On the other hand,
^' 6j=

: n  m so m j= '
n
and m  m so m j= '
m
from which we conclude that m j= 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so m j=  ^ '. Furthermore, for any model k, if k j=  ^ ', then k j= ' and k j= ' ! '
m
so k j= '
m
. From this it follows that m  k, but this means that m is a (actually, the
only) minimal model of  ^ ' and m j= ' so m 6j= . We conclude that ' does not respect
monotonicity, since we have found formulae  and  such that  j=

 but ^' 6j=

. 2
It may seem that the condition of expressibility of preference is too restrictive. However,
we will see that it is useful for the examples.
Proposition 23 For Ground S5, MTEL and nite predicate and domain circumscription,
only downward persistent formulae respect monotonicity.
Proof: Remark that all of these logics satisfy Assumption 1. First consider Ground S5.
Let us rst take the language to be nite (that is, P is nite). Take any S5 model M .
For each propositional valuation m, dene the formula 
m
by 
m
=
V
fp 2 P j m j=
pg ^
V
f:p j p 2 P;m 6j= pg. This is a well-dened formula since P is nite. Now construct
'
M
=
V
fK(:
m
) j m =2 Mg, which is again a well-dened formula since Mod(P ) is
nite. It can easily be seen that any S5 model N satises '
M
if and only if M  N . So
expressibility of preference is satised, whence Theorem 22 ensures that only downward
persistent formulae respect monotonicity for this nite language. Now let P be arbitrary,
and suppose ' in this language respects monotonicity. Then it is easy to see that if we
restrict the language to atoms occurring in ', it still respects monotonicity, so it is downward
persistent in the restricted language. It follows easily that ' is also downward persistent in
the full language.
For MTEL, the same considerations make it sucient to give a formula '
M
for a nite
language only, so let us take P nite. Then every S5 model M(i) is a nite set of propo-
sitional valuations. Since the sequence fM(i)g is decreasing with respect to set-inclusion
(as M is conservative), there will be an index k such that M(j) = M(k) for all j > k.
To improve readability of the formula '
M
we dene the formulae at
i
to be P
i
> ^H
i+1
?
(where P
i
stands for a sequence of P operators of length i). It is easy to see that for any
model N we have (N ; j) j= at
i
if and only if j = i. Now dene:
'
M
=
V
f2(at
i
! '
M(i)
) j 0  i  kg, where '
M(i)
is the formula as dened in the case of
Ground S5 for the S5 modelM(i) . It is easy to show that N j= '
M
if and only ifM N .
For nite circumscription, we need the more general denition of expressibility of prefer-
ence hinted at before (in rst-order logic, there may be equivalent models: dierent models
that satisfy the same rst-order formulae). Here we need not restrict the language. In
predicate circumscription, the required formula '
M
for a nite structure M expresses: (i)
the exact number of elements of the domain of M , (ii) for which of these elements P holds,
and (iii) for all other predicates Q it expresses for which elements Q holds, and for which its
negation holds. In domain circumscription, the required formula '
M
for a nite structure
M expresses the fact that there are (at least) as many elements as in M , and for each
predicate Q, it expresses for which of these elements Q holds, and for which elements its
negation holds. 2
It is not possible to nd the required formula '
M
in (non-nite) circumscription in
general: for innite structures we are not in general able to express the number of elements,
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and we can not describe the entire extensions of predicates in general. Indeed, the above
result does not hold for domain circumscription. It is still an open question whether it holds
for predicate circumscription.
Proposition 24 For domain circumscription, there exists a rst-order predicate formula
which respects monotonicity but is not downward persistent.
Proof: Consider the rst-order language L = f<;=g, and let ' be a sentence stating that
< is a dense linear ordering without begin- or endpoint. This is a complete theory (Rabin,
1977, Theorem 4), which means that for any  2 L, either ' j=  or ' j= :. Now suppose
 j=
DC
. If ' j= : then  ^ ' is inconsistent, so  ^ ' j=
DC
 trivially. Otherwise we
have that ' j=  so  ^ ' is equivalent to '. But it is easy to see that ' does not have a
minimal model, so again we have  ^ ' j=
DC
. However, ' is not downward persistent: it
holds in the real numbers, but not in the substructure of the natural numbers. 2
Until now we have considered formulae that can be added to any premise, but we can
also ask the question whether a formula respects monotonicity for a given, xed premise.
Proposition 25 Given a preferential logic such that Mod is nite and for all m 2 Mod
there exists 
m
2 L such that n j= 
m
if and only if n = m, let  be a xed formula in L.
Then we have for all ' 2 L:
8( j=

 )  ^ ' j=

), 8m 2 Mod(m j=

 ^ ') m j=

):
Proof: The right to left direction is trivial (and does not depend on the assumption). For
the other direction, suppose that 8( j=

 )  ^ ' j=

). Let m 2 Mod be arbitrary
and suppose m j=

 ^ '. Now dene  =
W
f
n
j n j=

g; this is a well-dened formula
since Mod was assumed nite. It is easy to see that  j=

: suppose n j=

, then 
n
is one of the disjuncts of , and by denition of 
n
, we have n j= 
n
, so n j= . But the
assumption now gives that  ^ ' j=

. As m j=

 ^ ', we have m j= , so there is an
n 2 Mod with n j=

 and m j= 
n
. But by denition of 
n
this means that m = n so
m j=

. 2
Proposition 25 states that a formula ' respects monotonicity for a xed premise  if
and only if the minimal models of  ^ ' are minimal models of . Of course the criterion
on the right-hand side is hard to check; we can give another criterion, but for that, we rst
need the following denition (Kraus et al., 1990):
Denition 26 (Smoothness) A preferential logic is called smooth, if the following holds:
8 2 L : 8m 2 Mod : (m j= ) 9n 2 Mod : n  m & n j=

):
This condition, which is also called stopperedness or well-foundedness, and is akin to
the limit assumption (Lewis, 1973), forbids chains of ever-decreasing models satisfying a
formula. It is one of the basic properties in the framework of Kraus et al. (1990).
Proposition 27 Given a smooth preferential logic, we have: 8m 2 Mod(m j=

 ^ ' )
m j=

) if and only if 8m 2 Mod(m j=  ^ ') 9n 2Mod(n  m;n j=

 and n j= ')).
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The proof of this proposition is straightforward, and again it may not help much. As
far as the examples are concerned, the conclusion of Proposition 25 holds for both Ground
S5 and MTEL (the properties depend only on  and ' so we may restrict the signature and
then use the proposition). Proposition 27 holds for Ground S5 (which is smooth). From
these propositions we can nd some sucient conditions. If ' is downward persistent in
the models of , then Proposition 25 ensures that ' respects monotonicity with respect to
. If  j=

' then Proposition 27 ensures that ' respects monotonicity with respect to 
(but this also follows immediately with the rule of Cautious Monotonicity, which is satised
in smooth preferential logics, Kraus et al., 1990). It seems hard to nd a simple criterion
necessary and sucient for respecting monotonicity for a given premise. We leave this for
further research.
4. Conservativity
In the previous section we have considered formulae that can always be added to a premise
without invalidating any of the conclusions. In this section we will focus on the conclusions,
and study formulae that, when they are concluded, can always be kept, no matter which
new information is added to the premise. We will call these formulae conservative.
Denition 28 (Conservative) Given a preferential logic, we say a formula  is conser-
vative, if
8;' :  j=

 )  ^ ' j=

:
We have the following result connecting upward persistent and conservative formulae,
in analogy with Proposition 14.
Proposition 29 Given a preferential logic that is smooth, if a formula is upward persistent,
it is conservative.
Proof: Let  be upward persistent in a smooth preferential logic. Now suppose  j=

 .
Take any model m such that m j=

 ^ ', then m j=  so by smoothness, there is a model
n with n  m and n j=

. Then, as  j=

, we have n j= . Since n  m and  is
upward persistent, we have m j= . This shows that  ^ ' j=

, so  is conservative. 2
Again, we can ask if the upward persistent formulae are the only conservative formulae,
and this is true under the same conditions as in the case of respecting monotonicity.
Proposition 30 (Only if : : : ) For a preferential logic that satises expressibility of pref-
erence we have: if a formula is conservative, then it is upward persistent.
Proof: Suppose  is not upward persistent, then there are n;m 2 Mod such that n  m,
and n j=  but m 6j= . Now take  = '
n
and ' = '
m
. Then n is the only minimal model
of  and n j=  so  j=

, but m is a (actually, the only one) minimal model of ^', and
m 6j= , so  ^ ' 6j=

. Thus,  is not conservative. 2
Let us rst identify the upward persistent formulae for our examples. This is relatively
straightforward, since we have the following elementary result.
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Proposition 31 For any preferential logic, ' is upward persistent if and only if :' is
downward persistent.
This gives us the following.
Proposition 32
1. Dene BOX ::= K(') j BOX ^ BOX j BOX _ BOX j K(BOX) with ' propositional.
Then a subjective S5 formula ' is upward persistent in Ground S5 if and only if it is
S5-equivalent to a formula in BOX.
2. Dene TB ::= BOX j TB^TB j TB_TB j F (TB) j G(TB) j P (TB) j H(TB). Then a
subjective TEL formula ' is upward persistent in MTEL if and only if it is equivalent
(in the sense of ) to a formula in TB.
3. A rst-order formula is upward persistent in predicate circumscription (of P ) if and
only if it is equivalent to a formula that is positive in P (meaning that all occurrences
of the predicate P are in the scope of an even number of negations). A rst-order
formula is upward persistent in domain circumscription if and only if it is equivalent
to an existential formula (a formula of the form 9x
1
: : : x
n
 where  is quantier
free).
Proof: Straightforward. 2
In the above denition, formulae from BOX essentially only contain the K operator (the
`box' of S5); TB stands for `temporal box' formulae. Now let us see what Propositions 29
and 30 say about the examples. Ground S5 satises expressibility of preference (for a nite
language) and is smooth, so the conservative formulae are exactly the upward persistent
formulae, which express only knowledge (and not ignorance). This can be lifted again
to an innite language. The fact that in Ground S5, formulae that express propositional
knowledge, are conservative, was already noted by Donini et al. (1997). MTEL also satises
expressibility of preference (for a nite language), so any formula that is conservative, must
be upward persistent, and must be equivalent to a formula in TB, expressing knowledge
over time (not ignorance). This can be lifted to an innite language. Unfortunately, MTEL
is not smooth: the formula F (Kp) is satisable, but has no minimal model. In MTEL,
we have that F (Kp) j=
MTEL
F (Kq), but F (Kp) ^ Kp 6j=
MTEL
F (Kq) (F (Kp) ^ Kp has a
minimal model, in which only p is known, from the rst point in time onwards). This means
that the formula F (Kq) is not conservative, although it is upward persistent. It is easy to
see that in any preferential logic, valid formulae are always conservative, but in MTEL,
these are (almost) the only ones.
Denition 33 We call a TEL model M totally ignorant, if for all propositional formulae
' we have: if M j= F (K') then ' is a propositional tautology. Dene the totally ignorant
model M
ti
by M
ti
(i) =Mod(P ) for all i.
In a totally ignorant model, no knowledge is ever gained. The totally ignorant model is
certainly a totally ignorant model, and if P is nite, it is the only one.
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Proposition 34 For MTEL, in case P is innite, we have that a formula is conservative
if and only if it is true in all models. When P is nite, a formula is conservative if and
only if it is true in all models except possibly the totally ignorant model.
Proof: We will prove that  is conservative if and only if it is true in all models that are not
totally ignorant (both when P is nite and when it is innite). First, supposeM is a model
that is not totally ignorant, in which  is not true. So M j= F (K) for some propositional
formula  that is not a propositional tautology. If P is nite, we can consider the formula
'
M
(see the proof of Proposition 23 for the denition of '
M
). If P is innite, one can
show thatM can be chosen in such a way that it is a `inherently nite' model, allowing the
construction of a formula '
M
with the same properties as for the case when P is nite (using
essentially the same construction). The details of this argument are left to the reader. The
formula F (K) does not have a minimal model ( must be known sometimes in the future,
but this moment can always be postponed, yielding a smaller model), so F (K) j=
MTEL
.
On the other hand, it can easily be shown that the only minimal model of F (K) ^ '
M
is
M , which gives us F (K) ^ '
M
6j=
MTEL
. This means that  is not conservative.
Now suppose that  is true in all models that are not totally ignorant, and suppose
 j=
MTEL
. Let M be a minimal model of  ^ '. If M is not totally ignorant, then
M j= . If it is totally ignorant, then also M
ti
j= ^' (it can be shown by induction that
all totally ignorant models satisfy the same formulae). But then M
ti
j= . Since no model
is preferred over M
ti
, this means that M
ti
j=

 so M
ti
j= , whence M j= . It follows
that  ^ ' j=
MTEL
, so  is conservative.
Let us look at the case when P is innite. Suppose M 6j= , with M totally ignorant.
Now take a propositional atom p not occurring in . It can easily be shown that we can
nd a model of Kp in which  is not satised. This model is of course not totally ignorant.
This shows that if  is true in all models that are not totally ignorant, then it is true in all
models. In case P is nite, M
ti
is the only totally ignorant model. 2
So in MTEL with an innite P , valid formulae are the only conservative formulae.
These formulae are of course upward persistent (in a trivial way), and they are equivalent
to a formula in TB, for instance K(>). When the signature is nite, there are some extra
formulae that are conservative, for example if P = fp; qg, then the formula F (K(p _ q) _
K(:p _ q) _K(p _ :q) _K(:p _ :q)) is also conservative (it is true in all models except
the totally ignorant one). Of course, this formula is upward persistent, and it is in TB.
Finite predicate and domain circumscription satisfy both expressibility of preference
and smoothness, so the conservative formulae coincide with the upward persistent formulae
which have the syntactic characterization of Proposition 32.
Full circumscription satises neither of the conditions.
Proposition 35 In predicate and domain circumscription there are upward persistent for-
mulae that are not conservative.
Proof: First consider predicate circumscription. Let the language consist of three predi-
cates besides equality, namely P , Succ and < (and P is circumscribed). Dene the formulae
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 and ' as follows:
 = 8x9!y(Succ(x; y))^ ' = 8xy(Px ^ Succ(y; x)! Py)
8x9!y(Succ(y; x))^
8xy(Succ(x; y)! x < y)^
8xyz(x < y ^ y < z ! x < z)^
8x(:(x < x))^
8xy(x < y _ y < x _ x = y)^
9xPx
8xy(Px ^ Succ(x; y)! Py)
The intuitive meaning of  is that there are Succ-chains of elements, extending indenitely
in both directions. If P occurs somewhere on such a chain, it must be true in all successors
as well. A model of  can be made smaller (more preferred) by making P false in a point
and all of its predecessors (leaving it true in all successors). We will now make this argument
formal. The rst claim is that  has no 
P
- minimal models. LetM be a model of . Then
there must be an x 2 dom(M) with x 2 P
M
. Dene A = fxg [ fy 2 P
M
j (y; x) 2<
M
g.
Let N be the structure with the same domain asM , the same extension of Succ and <, and
P
N
= P
M
n A. It is straightforward to verify that N is a model of , and that N 
P
M
and N 6=M .
On the other hand, ^' has minimal models. LetM be the structure with dom(M) = Z
(the integers), (a; b) 2 Succ
M
, b = a + 1, (a; b) 2<
M
, a < b in the natural ordering
on the integers, and P
M
= Z. It can easily be checked that M j=  ^ '. Now suppose
N 
P
M , N 6=M and N j= ^'. This means that P
N
 Z (strict inclusion), and P
N
6= ;
(as N j= 9xPx). But then there must be x; y 2 Z with y = x+ 1, and either x 2 P
N
and
y =2 P
N
, or x =2 P
N
and y 2 P
N
, contradicting either N j= 8xy(Px ^ Succ(x; y) ! Py)
(N j= ) or N j= '. Therefore M is a minimal model of  ^ '.
Now dene  = 9x(x 6= x), which is trivially upward persistent. Since  has no minimal
models, we have  j=
PC
P
, but M 6j= , so  ^ ' 6j=
PC
P
. This shows that  is not
conservative.
For domain circumscription, the example is quite similar. Again take  = 9x(x 6= x).
Now dene the formulae  and ' as follows:
 = 8x9!y(Succ(x; y))^ ' = 8y9x(Succ(x; y))
8xy(Succ(x; y)! x < y)^
8xyz(x < y ^ y < z ! x < z)^
8x(:(x < x))^
8xy(x < y _ y < x _ x = y)^
8xyz(Succ(x; z) ^ Succ(y; z)! x = y)
One can now check that  has no 
d
-minimal models, but  ^ ' does, so the same  is
upward persistent but not conservative in domain circumscription. The details are left to
the reader. 2
Until now, we have looked at formulae which, once concluded, are never lost, regardless
of what new information comes in, but also regardless of what the initial premise was.
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However, we can also consider the situation with the premise xed (analogously to the last
part of the previous section): given a premise, which conclusions may be kept regardless of
new information?
Proposition 36 For a preferential logic that satises expressibility of preference, if
 j=

, then
(8' :  ^ ' j=

),  j= :
Proof: Suppose  j=

.
\(" If  j=  then for any ' we have  ^ ' j=  so  ^ ' j=

.
\)" Suppose  6j= , then there exists m 2 Mod such that m j=  but m 6j= . Then
m j=

 ^ '
m
(!), so  ^ '
m
6j=

. 2
Note that the condition  j=

 was not used in the proof; if  6j=

 the equivalence is
still true, as both sides are false. The proposition shows that the monotonic consequences
of a premise are the only ones conservative with respect to this xed premise.
Corollary 37 Let  be a conservative formula for a preferential logic that satises express-
ibility of preference, then  j=

 ,  j= .
Proof: If  j=  then in any preferential logic it follows that  j=

. On the other hand, if
 j=

 , then for any ' we have ^' j=

 , since  is conservative. With Proposition 36
it follows that  j= . 2
In the last two sections, we have derived a number of results on formulae that respect
monotonicity and conservative formulae and the links with persistent formulae. In the next
section we will discuss the impact of these results in practice.
5. Practical Implications
The results in this paper may improve the eciency of theorem provers for preferential
logics, depending on a number of factors. In the rst place, it is important how the theorem
prover is used.
Consider the situation where we have a stand-alone theorem prover which gets dierent
(unrelated) queries. Furthermore, suppose the theorem prover is asked to prove 
1
^ : : : ^

n
j=

. Then there are at least two possibilities for using the results in the paper.
First of all, suppose the preferential logic satises expressibility of preference. Then if 
is upward persistent, we do not have to prove 
1
^ : : : ^ 
n
j=

, as it is equivalent to
prove 
1
^ : : : ^ 
n
j=  (Corollary 37). In most preferential logics, preferential entailment
is harder to compute than entailment in the underlying logic.
In the second place, sometimes local reasoning is possible (which is not possible in general
for non-monotonic logics): the theorem prover may derive the conclusion from part of the
premise. So it may be the case that there is a 1  k < n such that 
1
^ : : :^
k
j=

 which
is easier to verify than the original query. Then if 
k+1
; : : : ; 
n
are downward persistent,
Proposition 14 implies that 
1
^: : :^
n
j=

. If  is upward persistent (and the preferential
logic is smooth), Proposition 29 sanctions 
1
^ : : :^
n
j=

. For these results to be usable
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in a theorem prover, we need heuristic knowledge to decide if there is a promising split of
the premise into two parts A and B. For such a split, we can then try to prove A j=


and downward persistence of B or upward persistence of . In case 
1
^ : : :^
k
j=

 can
not be proved, we may have to directly prove 
1
^ : : : ^ 
n
j=

 after all.
These two methods will of course only improve eciency if the determination of persis-
tence is easier than the original query (we will treat this question below).
The second kind of situation is when we have a theorem prover which is used by an
agent which has a lot of knowledge about the world, and from time to time performs
observations to increase its knowledge. Then, although sometimes the agent will need to
perform revisions, we are often in the situation that (many) conclusions from a premise
() have been proved, and the premise is augmented by a new formula ('). If this new
formula is downward persistent, then the agent can retain all the old conclusions (and may
only need to derive some new conclusions). If it is not, it can at least retain all the upward
persistent conclusions (if the preferential logic is smooth). We may also try to determine
if ' is downward persistent given , or if  is conservative given . Again, these methods
only improve eciency if it is easier to determine if ' respects monotonicity (possibly given
) than recomputing all old conclusions, or if it is easier to determine that  is conservative
(possibly given ) than checking  ^ ' j=

.
The possible eciency improvement in both cases heavily depends on the cost of de-
termining persistence relative to the cost of determining preferential consequence. Unfor-
tunately, it is very hard to say anything about this issue in general. It depends on the
preferential logic at hand, on the representation of the logic (syntactically, as a proof cal-
culus, or semantically, as models with a preference relation), and on other implementation
issues. For instance, it can be important how much information is retained from previous
queries: whether proofs or minimal models are stored. Let us consider the examples again.
Preferential entailment in both Ground S5 and MTEL is
Q
P
3
-complete (Engelfriet,
1996a), whereas full circumscription is undecidable (restricted versions of circumscription
exist which are decidable, but still highly complex). Unfortunately, determining downward
or upward persistence is not easier for these logics. We have seen that the classes of persis-
tent formulae have syntactic representations of the form: ' is upward/downward persistent
if and only if it is equivalent to a formula in C, where C is a (syntactic) class of formulae.
Now, of course, determining equivalence to a formula in C is as complex as determining
persistence, but there may be subclasses of a class of persistent formulae, with a lower
complexity. For instance, determining membership of C is much easier, namely polynomial.
The members of C are persistent. So what we propose is to check membership of C, instead
of equivalence to a member of C. In that case, we will miss some persistent formulae (and
have to prove the original query), but this disadvantage is outweighed by the complexity
advantage of checking membership. The checking of membership can be improved upon by
adding some (easy) checks for equivalence to a formula in C. For instance, in Ground S5,
if we consider, for a formula ', for each propositional sub-formula, the nearest K operator
in which scope it lies, then if all of these K operators are in the scope of an odd number of
negations, we can conclude that ' is downward persistent. The formula :K(q _Kp), for
example, satises this condition, and although it is not a member of DIAM, it is equivalent
to :Kq ^ :Kp 2 DIAM. This check is obviously polynomial.
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Given a preferential logic, the designer of a theorem prover could proceed as follows.
First, syntactic classes of formulae that are downward and upward persistent have to be
identied. For Ground S5, MTEL and predicate and domain circumscription, these can be
found in Denitions 15, 17, 19 and Proposition 32. For other preferential logics, if such
classes are trivial (they may, for instance, only include tautologies and contradictions),
then the usefulness of the results is limited. Otherwise, the theorem prover could work
as follows. Given a query of the form  ^ ' j=

, rst it is checked if ' belongs to the
syntactic class of downward persistent formulae or if  belongs to the syntactic class of
upward persistent formulae (this latter test should only be performed if the preferential
logic is smooth). If  is conservative and the logic satises expressibility of preference, it
tries to prove  ^ ' j=  (this usually has a lower complexity than the original query; for
Ground S5 and MTEL, monotonic consequence is NP-complete, Engelfriet, 1996a). The
answer of this query is the answer to the original query (see Corollary 37). Otherwise, if
' belongs to the syntactic class of downward persistent formulae or if  belongs to the
syntactic class of upward persistent formulae (but the logic does not satisfy expressibility
of preference), then the theorem prover tries to prove  j=

. If this succeeds, it outputs
yes. Otherwise, it will try to answer the original query directly.
As stated before, the practical savings in part depend on representation and implemen-
tation aspects. It also depends on the application domain and use of the theorem prover:
if formulae in these syntactic classes occur often, the eciency improvement is higher than
if they are infrequent.
6. Conclusions and Further Research
We have looked at restrictions of monotonicity in preferential logics. While monotonicity
does not hold in general, we can identify (in general non-trivial) classes of formulae for
which restricted versions of monotonicity holds. This may make (nonmonotonic) deduction
in preferential logics easier, since we may sometimes keep conclusions, or identify which
conclusions may be kept, when adding new information to a premise. The results in this
paper may lead to more ecient implementations of preferential logics. Experimenting with
theorem provers which use these results is necessary in order to determine the eciency
improvement in practice.
It would be nice to nd a better characterization of formulae that can be added to a
given, xed premise without destroying conclusions.
Syntactic characterizations of persistent formulae were given for a number of example
preferential logics, but we would like to have a result for broader classes of preferential
logics, such as the class of ground nonmonotonic modal logics (Donini et al., 1997).
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